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Statistics, Causality and Bell’s Theorem
Richard D. Gill
Abstract. Bell’s [Physics 1 (1964) 195–200] theorem is popularly supposed
to establish the nonlocality of quantum physics. Violation of Bell’s inequality
in experiments such as that of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger [Phys. Rev. Lett.
49 (1982) 1804–1807] provides empirical proof of nonlocality in the real
world. This paper reviews recent work on Bell’s theorem, linking it to issues
in causality as understood by statisticians. The paper starts with a proof of a
strong, finite sample, version of Bell’s inequality and thereby also of Bell’s
theorem, which states that quantum theory is incompatible with the conjunc-
tion of three formerly uncontroversial physical principles, here referred to as
locality, realism and freedom.
Locality is the principle that the direction of causality matches the direction
of time, and that causal influences need time to propagate spatially. Realism
and freedom are directly connected to statistical thinking on causality: they
relate to counterfactual reasoning, and to randomisation, respectively. Ex-
perimental loopholes in state-of-the-art Bell type experiments are related to
statistical issues of post-selection in observational studies, and the missing at
random assumption. They can be avoided by properly matching the statistical
analysis to the actual experimental design, instead of by making untestable
assumptions of independence between observed and unobserved variables.
Methodological and statistical issues in the design of quantum Randi chal-
lenges (QRC) are discussed.
The paper argues that Bell’s theorem (and its experimental confirmation)
should lead us to relinquish not locality, but realism.
Key words and phrases: Counterfactuals, Bell inequality, CHSH inequal-
ity, Tsirelson inequality, Bell’s theorem, Bell experiment, Bell test loophole,
nonlocality, local hidden variables, quantum Randi challenge.
1. INTRODUCTION
Bell’s (1964) theorem states that certain predictions
of quantum mechanics are incompatible with the con-
junction of three fundamental principles of classical
physics which are sometimes given the short names
“realism”, “locality” and “freedom”. Corresponding
real world experiments, Bell experiments, are supposed
to demonstrate that this incompatibility is a property
not just of the theory of quantum mechanics, but also
of nature itself. The consequence is that we are forced
to reject at least one of these three principles.
Richard D. Gill is Professor, Mathematical Institute,
University of Leiden, Niels Bohrweg 1, Leiden, 2333 CA,
The Netherlands (e-mail: gill@math.leidenuniv.nl; URL:
http://www.math.leidenuniv.nl/~gill).
Both theorem and experiment hinge around an in-
equality constraining probability distributions of out-
comes of measurements on spatially separated physical
systems; an inequality which must hold if all three fun-
damental principles are true. In a nutshell, the inequal-
ity is an empirically verifiable consequence of the idea
that the outcome of one measurement on one system
cannot depend on which measurement is performed on
the other. This idea, called locality or, more precisely,
relativistic local causality, is just one of the three prin-
ciples. Its formulation refers to outcomes of measure-
ments which are not actually performed, so we have
to assume their existence, alongside of the outcomes
of those actually performed: the principle of realism,
or more precisely, counterfactual definiteness. Finally,
we need to assume that we have complete freedom to
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choose which of several measurements to perform—
this is the third principle, also called the no-conspiracy
principle or no super-determinism. (As we shall see,
super-determinism is a conspiratorial form of deter-
minism.)
We shall implement the freedom assumption as the
assumption of statistical independence between the
randomisation in a randomised experimental design,
and the set of outcomes of each experimental unit un-
der all possible treatments. This set consists of the
“counterfactual” outcomes of those treatments which
were not actually applied, as well as the “factual” out-
come belonging to the treatment chosen by the ran-
domisation.
By existence of the outcomes of not actually per-
formed experiments, we mean their mathematical exis-
tence within some mathematical-physical theory of the
phenomenon in question. So “realism” actually refers
to models of reality, not to reality itself. Moreover, it
could be thought of as a somewhat idealistic position.
If we already have an adequate mathematical physical
model of reality, there would not seem to be a press-
ing need to add into this theory some mathematical
description of outcomes of experiments which are not
performed; and even if we do that, why should we de-
mand that these counterfactual objects satisfy the same
kind of physical constraints as the factual objects?
However, it is a fact that prior to quantum physics, re-
alism was a completely natural property of all physical
theories.
The concepts of realism and locality together are of-
ten considered as one principle called local realism.
Local realism is implied by the existence of local hid-
den variables, whether deterministic or stochastic. In
a precise mathematical sense, the reverse implication
is also true: local realism implies that we can con-
struct a local hidden variable (LHV) model for the phe-
nomenon under study. However, one likes to think of
this assumption (or pair of assumptions), the important
thing to realize is that it is a completely unproblematic
feature of all classical physical theories; freedom (no
conspiracy) even more so.
The connection between Bell’s theorem and statis-
tical notions of causality has been noted many times
in the past. For instance, in a short note, Robins, Van-
derWeele and Gill (2015) derive Bell’s inequality us-
ing the statistical language of causal interactions. The
causal graph (DAG) of observed and unobserved vari-
ables corresponding to a classical physical description
of one run of a standard Bell experiment is given in
Figure 1. Alice and Bob’s settings are binary: they in-
dependently use randomisation (a coin toss) to choose
between one of two settings on a measurement device.
The outcome of each measurement is also binary. Ob-
served variables are represented by grey rectangles; un-
observed (there is only one, but of course it might be of
arbitrarily complex nature) by a white oval. The valid-
ity of this causal model places restrictions on the joint
distribution of the observed variables; see, for instance,
Ver Steeg and Galstyan (2011).
In view of the experimental support for violation of
Bell’s inequality, the present writer prefers to imagine
a world in which “realism” is not a fundamental prin-
ciple of physics but only an emergent property in the
familiar realm of daily life. In this way, we can keep
quantum mechanics, locality and freedom. This posi-
tion does entail taking quantum randomness very seri-
ously: it becomes an irreducible feature of the physical
world, a “primitive notion”; it is not “merely” an emer-
gent feature. He believes that within this position, the
FIG. 1. A classical description of a Bell-CHSH type experiment entails the validity of the graphical model described by this simple causal
graph. Rectangles: observed variables; ellipse: unobserved. Settings and outcomes are both binary. Experimental results arguably (via Bell’s
theorem) show that the classical description has to be abandoned. The probability distribution of experimental data is far outside the class
of probability distributions allowed by the model.
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measurement problem (Schrödinger cat problem) has a
decent mathematical solution, in which causality is the
guiding principle (Slava Belavkin’s “eventum mechan-
ics”).
Many practical minded physicists claim to be ad-
herents of the so-called Many Worlds interpretation
(MWI) of quantum mechanics. In the writer’s opinion
(but also of many writers on quantum foundations), this
interpretation also entails a rejection of “realism”, but
now in a very strong sense: the reality of an actual ran-
dom path taken by Nature through space–time is de-
nied. The only reality is the ensemble of all possible
paths. Devilish experiments lead to dead cats turning
up on some paths, and alive cats on others. According
to MWI, the only reality is the quantum wave-function.
The reality of the death (or not) of the cat is an illusion.
2. BELL’S INEQUALITY
To begin with, I will establish a new version of the
famous Bell inequality (more precisely: Bell-CHSH
inequality). My version is not an inequality about
theoretical expectation values, but is a probabilistic
inequality about experimentally observed averages.
Probability derives purely from randomisation in the
experimental design.
Consider a spreadsheet containing an N × 4 table of
numbers ±1. The rows will be labelled by an index
j = 1, . . . ,N . The columns are labelled with names A,
A′, B and B ′. I will denote the four numbers in the
j th row of the table by Aj , A′j , Bj and B ′j . Denote
by 〈AB〉 = (1/N)∑Nj=1 AjBj , the average over the N
rows of the product of the elements in the A and B
columns. Define 〈AB ′〉, 〈A′B〉, 〈A′B ′〉 similarly.
Suppose that for each row of the spreadsheet, two
fair coins are tossed independently of one another, in-
dependently over all the rows. Suppose that depending
on the outcomes of the two coins, we either get to see
the value of A or A′, and either the value of B or B ′.
We can therefore determine the value of just one of
the four products AB , AB ′, A′B , and A′B ′, each with
equal probability 14 , for each row of the table. Denote
by 〈AB〉obs the average of the observed products of A
and B (“undefined” if the sample size is zero). Define
〈AB ′〉obs, 〈A′B〉obs and 〈A′B ′〉obs similarly.
FACT 1. For any four numbers A, A′, B , B ′ each
equal to ±1,
AB + AB ′ + A′B − A′B ′ = ±2.(1)
PROOF. Notice that
AB +AB ′ +A′B −A′B ′ = A(B +B ′)+A′(B −B ′).
B and B ′ are either equal to one another or unequal.
In the former case, B − B ′ = 0 and B + B ′ = ±2; in
the latter case B − B ′ = ±2 and B + B ′ = 0. Thus,
AB + AB ′ + A′B − A′B ′ equals either A or A′, both
of which equal ±1, times ±2. All possibilities lead to
AB + AB ′ + A′B − A′B ′ = ±2. 
FACT 2.
〈AB〉 + 〈AB ′〉+ 〈A′B〉− 〈A′B ′〉≤ 2.(2)
PROOF. By (1),
〈AB〉 + 〈AB ′〉+ 〈A′B〉− 〈A′B ′〉
= 〈AB + AB ′ + A′B − A′B ′〉 ∈ [−2,2]. 
Formula (2) is known as the CHSH inequality
(Clauser et al., 1969). It is a generalisation of the orig-
inal Bell (1964) inequality.
When N is large one would expect 〈AB〉obs to be
close to 〈AB〉, and the same for the other three aver-
ages of observed products. Hence, equation (2) should
remain approximately true when we replace the av-
erages of the four products over all N rows with the
averages of the four products in each of four disjoint
sub-samples of expected size N/4 each. The follow-
ing theorem expresses this intuition in a precise and
useful way. Its straightforward proof, given in the Ap-
pendix, uses two Hoeffding (1963) inequalities (expo-
nential bounds on the tail of binomial and hypergeo-
metric distributions) to probabilistically bound the dif-
ference between 〈AB〉obs and 〈AB〉, etc.
THEOREM 1. Given an N ×4 spreadsheet of num-
bers ±1 with columns A, A′, B and B ′, suppose that,
completely at random, just one of A and A′ is observed
and just one of B and B ′ are observed in every row.
Then, for any η ≥ 0,
Pr
(〈AB〉obs + 〈AB ′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs
− 〈A′B ′〉obs ≤ 2 + η)(3)
≥ 1 − 8e−N(η/16)2 .
Traditional presentations of Bell’s theorem derive
the large N limit of this result. If for N → ∞, exper-
imental averages converge to theoretical mean values,
then by (3) these must satisfy
〈AB〉lim + 〈AB ′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B ′〉lim ≤ 2.(4)
Like (2), this inequality is also called the CHSH in-
equality.
I conclude this section with an open problem. An
analysis by Vongehr (2013) of the original Bell in-
equality, which is “just” the CHSH inequality in the
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situation that one of the four correlations is identically
equal to ±1, suggests that the following conjecture
might be true. I come back to this in the last section
of the paper.
CONJECTURE 1. Under the assumptions of Theo-
rem 1,
Pr
(〈AB〉obs + 〈AB ′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B ′〉obs > 2)(5)
≤ 12 .
3. BELL’S THEOREM
Both the original Bell inequality, and Bell-CHSH in-
equality (4), can be used to prove Bell’s theorem: quan-
tum mechanics is incompatible with the principles of
realism, locality and freedom. If we want to hold on
to all three principles, quantum mechanics must be re-
jected. Alternatively, if we want to hold on to quantum
theory, we have to relinquish at least one of those three
principles.
An executive summary of the proof of Bell’s theo-
rem consists purely of the following one-liner: certain
models in quantum physics, referring to an experiment
with the layout of Figure 1, predict
〈AB〉lim + 〈AB ′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B ′〉lim(6)
= 2√2.
More details will be given in a moment.
If we accept quantum mechanics, should we reject
locality, realism, or freedom? Almost no-one is pre-
pared to abandon freedom. It seems to be a matter of
changing fashion whether one blames locality or real-
ism. I will argue that we must place the blame on real-
ism, and not in the weak sense of the Copenhagen in-
terpretation which is a kind of dogmatic assertion that
it doesn’t make any sense to ask “what is actually go-
ing on behind the scenes”, but in a more positive sense:
the positive assertion that quantum randomness is both
real and fundamental. In classical physics, randomness
is merely the result of dependence on uncontrollable
initial conditions. Variation in those conditions, or un-
certainty about them, leads to variation, or uncertainty,
in the final result. However, there is no such explana-
tion for quantum randomness. Quantum randomness is
intrinsic, nonclassical, irreducible. It is not an emergent
phenomenon. It is the bottom line. It is a fundamental
feature of the fabric of reality.
For present purposes, we do not need to understand
any of the quantum mechanics behind (6): we just need
to know the specific statistical predictions which fol-
low from a particular model in quantum physics called
the EPR-B model. The initials refer here to the cele-
brated paradox of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935)
in a version introduced by Bohm (1951). The EPR-B
model predicts the statistics of measurements of spin
on each of an entangled pair of spin-half quantum sys-
tems in the singlet state. Fortunately, we do not need to
understand any of these words in order to understand
what an EPR-B experiment looks like (see Figure 1
again).
In one run of this stylised experiment, two parti-
cles are generated together at a source, and then travel
to two distant locations. Here, they are measured by
two experimenters Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob are
each in possession of a measurement apparatus which
can “measure the spin of a particle in any chosen di-
rection”. Alice (and similarly, Bob) can freely choose
(and set) a setting on her measurement apparatus. Al-
ice’s setting is an arbitrary direction in real three-
dimensional space represented by a unit vector a. Her
apparatus will then register an observed outcome ±1
which is called the observed spin of Alice’s particle in
direction a. At the same time, far away, Bob chooses
a direction b and also gets to observe an outcome ±1.
This is repeated many times—the complete experiment
will consist of a total of N runs. We will imagine Al-
ice and Bob repeatedly choosing new settings for each
new run, in the same fashion as in Section 2: each toss-
ing a fair coin to make a binary choice between just
two possible settings, a and a′ for Alice, b and b′ for
Bob.
First, we will complete our description of the quan-
tum mechanical predictions for each run separately.
For pairs of particles in the singlet state, the prediction
of quantum mechanics is that in whatever directions
Alice and Bob perform their measurements, their out-
come ±1 is completely random, that is, both marginal
distributions are uniform. The outcomes are not, how-
ever, independent. They are correlated, with correlation
depending on the two settings. To be precise, the ex-
pected value of the product of the outcomes is equal
to −a · b = − cos(θ) where θ is the angle between the
two directions.
With this information, we can write down the 2 × 2
table for the joint probability distribution of the out-
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comes at the two locations, given two settings differing
in direction by the angle θ :
+1 −1
+1 14(1 − cos(θ)) 14(1 + cos(θ))
−1 14(1 + cos(θ)) 14(1 − cos(θ))
Both marginals of the table are uniform. The expecta-
tion of the product of the outcomes equals the proba-
bility that they are equal minus the probability they are
different 24(1 − cos(θ)) − 24(1 + cos(θ)) = − cos(θ).
Physicists use the word “correlation” to refer to the raw
(uncentered, unnormalised) product moment but in this
case the physicist’s and the statistician’s correlation co-
incide.
As mentioned before, Alice and Bob now perform
N runs of the experiment according to the following
randomised experimental design. Alice has fixed in ad-
vance two particular directions a and a′; Bob has fixed
in advance two particular directions b and b′. In each
run, Alice and Bob are each sent one of a new pair of
particles in the singlet state. While their particles are
en route to them, they each toss a fair coin in order to
choose one of their two measurement directions. In to-
tal N times, Alice observes either A = ±1 or A′ = ±1
say, and Bob observes either B = ±1 or B ′ = ±1. At
the end of the experiment, four “correlations” are cal-
culated: the four sample averages of the products AB ,
AB ′, A′B and A′B ′. Each correlation is based on a dif-
ferent subset of runs, of expected size N/4, determined
by the 2N fair coin tosses.
Under realism we can imagine, for each run, along-
side of the outcomes of the actually measured pair of
variables, also the outcomes of the not measured pair.
Under locality, the outcomes in Alice’s wing cannot
depend on the choice of which variable is measured in
Bob’s wing. Thus, for each run there is a suite of po-
tential outcomes A, A′, B and B ′, but only one of A
and A′, and only one of B and B ′ actually gets to be
observed. By freedom, the choices are statistically in-
dependent of the actual values of the four.
I will assume furthermore that the suite of coun-
terfactual outcomes in the j th run does not actually
depend on which particular variables were observed
in previous runs. This memoryless assumption can be
completely avoided by using the martingale version
of Hoeffding’s inequality, Gill (2003). But the present
analysis is already applicable if we imagine N copies
of the experiment each with only a single run, all being
done simultaneously in different laboratories.
a
a′
b′
b
FIG. 2. Four measurement directions, all in the same plane. Al-
ice’s settings are the two orthogonal directions a, a′, and Bob’s
settings are the orthogonal b, b′. Relative to one another, the pairs
are arranged so that a′ and b′ are close to pointing in the same
direction, while at the same time the other three pairs of one of Al-
ice’s and one of Bob’s settings (a and b, a and b′, a′ and b) are all
equally close to pointing in opposite directions.
The assumptions of realism, locality and freedom
have put us firmly in the situation of the previous sec-
tion. Therefore, by Theorem 1, the four sample corre-
lations (empirical raw product moments) satisfy (3).
Let us contrast this prediction with the quantum me-
chanical predictions obtained with a certain clever se-
lection of directions. We will take the four vectors a,
a′, b and b′ to lie in the same plane. It is then enough
to specify the angles α, α′, β , β ′ ∈ [0,2π ] which they
make with respect to some fixed vector in this plane.
Consider the choice α = 0, α′ = π/2, β = 5π/4, β ′ =
3π/4; see Figure 2. The differences |α − β|, |α − β ′|,
|α′ − β| are all equal to π ± π/4: these pairs of an-
gles are only 45 degrees away from being opposite
to one another; the corresponding measurements are
quite strongly positively correlated. On the other hand,
|α′ − β ′| = π/4: these two angles are 45 degrees away
from being equal and the corresponding measurements
are as strongly anti-correlated, as the other pairs were
strongly correlated. Three of the correlations are equal
to − cos(3π/4) = −(−1/√2) = 1/√2 and the fourth
is equal to − cos(π/4) = −1/√2. Thus, we would ex-
pect to see, up to statistical variation,
〈AB〉obs + 〈AB ′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B ′〉obs
≈ 4/√2 = 2√2 ≈ 2.828,
cf. (6). By Tsirelson’s inequality (Cirel’son, 1980),
this is actually the largest absolute deviation from the
CHSH inequality which is allowed by quantum me-
chanics.
Many experiments have been performed confirming
these predictions. Two particularly notable ones are
those of Aspect, Dalibard and Roger (1982) in Orsay,
Paris, and of Weihs et al. (1998) in Innsbruck (later I
will discuss two of the most recent).
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In these experiments, the choices of which direction
to measure were not literally made with coin tosses,
but by rather more practical physical systems. In Alain
Aspect’s Orsay and Gregor Weihs’ Innsbruck experi-
ments, the separation between the locations of Alice
and Bob was large; the time it took from initiating the
choice of random direction to measure to completion
of the measurement was small: so small, that Alice’s
measurement is complete before a signal traveling at
the speed of light could possibly transmit Bob’s choice
to Alice’s location. However, note that this depends on
what one considers to be the time each randomisation
starts happening. Weihs’ experiment improves on As-
pect’s in this respect.
The data gathered from the Innsbruck experiment
is available online. It had N ≈ 15,000; and found
〈AB〉obs + 〈AB ′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B ′〉obs = 2.73 ±
0.022, the statistical accuracy (standard deviation) fol-
lowing from a standard delta-method calculation as-
suming i.i.d. observations per setting pair. The reader
can check that this corresponds to accuracy obtained by
a standard computation using binomial variances of the
counts for each of the four roughly equal sub-samples.
By (3), under realism, locality and freedom, the chance
that 〈AB〉obs +〈AB ′〉obs +〈A′B〉obs −〈A′B ′〉obs would
exceed 2.73 is less than 10−12.
The experiment deviates in several ways from what
has been described so far, and I will summarise them
here.
An unimportant difference is the physical system
used: polarisation of entangled photons rather than spin
of entangled spin-half particles (e.g., electrons).
An important difference between the idealisation and
the truth concerns the picture of Alice and Bob repeat-
ing some actions N times with N fixed in advance. The
experimenters do not control when a pair of photons
will leave the source nor how many times this happens.
Even talking about “pairs of photons” is using classi-
cal physical language which can be acutely misleading.
In actual fact, all we observe are individual detection
events (time, current setting, outcome) at each of the
two detectors, that is, at each measurement apparatus.
Complicating this still further is the fact that many
particles fail to be detected at all. One could say that
the outcome of measuring one particle is not binary but
ternary: +, −, or no detection. If neither particle of a
pair is detected, then we do not even know there is a
pair at all. N was not only not fixed in advance: it is
not even known. The data cannot be summarised in a
list of pairs of settings and pairs of outcomes (whether
binary of ternary), but consists of two lists of the ran-
dom times of definite measurement outcomes in each
wing of the experiment together with the settings in
force at the time of the measurements. The settings are
being extremely rapidly, randomly switched, between
the two alternative values. When detection events oc-
cur close together in time they are treated as belonging
to a pair of photons.
In Weihs’ experiment, only 1 in 20 of the events in
each wing of the experiment seemed to be paired with
an event in the other. If all detections correspond to
emissions of pairs from the source, then for every 400
pairs of photons, just one pair leads to a paired event,
2 × 19 lead to unpaired events, and the remaining 361
to no observed event at all.
We will return to the issue of whether the idealised
picture of N pairs of particles, each separately being
measured, each particle in just one of two ways, is re-
ally appropriate, in a later section; we will also take a
look then at two more, very recent, experiments. How-
ever, the point is that quantum mechanics does seem to
promise that experiments of this nature could in princi-
ple be done, and if so, there seems no reason to doubt
they could violate the CHSH inequality. Three corre-
lations more or less equal to 1/
√
2 and one equal to
−1/√2 have been measured in the lab. Not to mention
that the whole curve − cos(θ) has been experimentally
recovered.
Right now the situation is that at least four major ex-
perimental groups (Singapore, Brisbane, Vienna, Illi-
nois) seem to be vying to be the first to perform a
successful and completely “loophole-free” experiment,
predictions being that this is no more than five years
away (cf. Marek ˙Zukowski, quoted in Merali, 2011). It
will be a major achievement, the crown of more than
fifty years’ labour.
4. REALISM, LOCALITY, FREEDOM
This section and the next are about metaphysics and
can safely be skipped by the reader impatient to learn
more about statistical aspects of Bell experiments.
The EPR-B correlations have a second message be-
yond the fact that they violate the CHSH inequality.
They also exhibit perfect anti-correlation in the case
that the two directions of measurement are exactly
equal—and perfect correlation in the case that they are
exactly opposite. This brings us straight to the EPR ar-
gument not for the nonlocality of quantum mechanics,
but for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935) were revulsed
by the idea that the “last word” in physics would be
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a “merely” statistical theory. Physics should explain
why, in each individual instance, what actually hap-
pens does happen. The belief that every “effect” must
have a “cause” has driven Western science since Aris-
totle. Now according to the singlet correlations, if Al-
ice were to measure the spin of her particle in direc-
tion a, it is certain that if Bob were to do the same,
he would find exactly the opposite outcome. Since it
is inconceivable that Alice’s choice has any immediate
influence on the particle over at Bob’s place, it must be
that the outcome of measuring Bob’s particle in the di-
rection a is predetermined “in the particle” as it were.
The measurement outcomes from measuring spin in all
conceivable directions on both particles must be pre-
determined properties of those particles. The observed
correlation is merely caused by their origin at a com-
mon source.
Thus Einstein used locality, together with the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics itself, to infer realism
or counterfactual definiteness in the strong sense that
the outcomes of measurements on physical systems
are predefined properties of those systems, carried in
them, and merely revealed by the act of measurement.
From this, he argued the incompleteness of quantum
mechanics—it describes some aggregate properties of
collectives of physical systems, but does not even deign
to talk about physically definitely existing properties of
individual systems.
Whether it needed external support or not, the notion
of counterfactual definiteness is nothing strange in all
of physics (prior to the invention of quantum mechan-
ics). It comes for free with a deterministic view of the
world as a collection of objects blindly obeying definite
rules.
Instead of assuming quantum mechanics and deriv-
ing counterfactual definiteness, Bell turned the EPR ar-
gument on its head. He assumes three principles which
Einstein would have endorsed anyway, and uses them
to get a contradiction with quantum mechanics; and the
first is counterfactual definiteness. We must first agree
that though, say, only A and B are actually measured
in one particular run, still, in a mathematical sense,
A′ and B ′ also exist (or at least may be constructed)
alongside of the other two; and moreover, they may be
thought to be located in space and time just where one
would imagine. Only after that does it make sense to
discuss locality: the assumption that which variable is
being observed at Alice’s location does not influence
the values taken by the other two at Bob’s location.
Having assumed realism and locality, we can bring
the freedom assumption into play. As we have seen,
it allowed us to analyse our experiment with classi-
cal probability tools based on a classically randomised
design. Some writers like to associate the freedom as-
sumption with the free will of the experimenter, oth-
ers with the existence of “true” randomness in other
physical processes: either way, one metaphysical as-
sumption is justified by another. I would rather see it
in a practical way: we understand pseudo-randomness
very well, and its principles underly coin tossing just
as much as pseudo random generators. We use ran-
domisation effectively in all kinds of contexts (ran-
domised algorithms, randomised clinical trials, ran-
domised designs). Do we really want to believe that
the observed correlations ±0.7071 (three positive, one
negative) come about through a physical mechanism
by which the outcomes of two coin tosses and two
polarisation measurements are all exquisitely depen-
dent on one another through all four being jointly pre-
determined by events in the deep past? When such a
hypothesis is otherwise completely unnecessary? (Oth-
erwise, we never see spatial-temporal correlations fol-
lowing this sign pattern, larger in absolute value than
0.5). A mechanism which is completely unknown?
A mechanism which ensures in effect that Alice’s pho-
ton knows how Bob’s photon is being measured? Yet,
a mechanism which cannot make any of those corre-
lations larger in absolute value than 0.7071, though
if it really were the case that Alice’s photon knows
Bob’s setting, three positive and one negative correla-
tion ±1.0 could have been achieved.
I think that Occam’s razor tells us to discard this
flavour of super-determinism, also known as conspir-
acy. In fact, to abandon freedom means to abandon
science: we may discard all empirical (observational)
data. Everything is explained but nothing can be pre-
dicted.
Keeping freedom, we have to make a choice between
two other inconceivable possibilities: do we reject lo-
cality, or do we reject realism?
Here, I would like to call on Occam’s principle
again. Suppose realism is true. Instead of invoking
the fact that a collection of four coin toss outcomes
and photo-detector clicks were jointly predetermined
in the deep past, we now have to invoke instantaneous
communication across large distances of the outcomes
of these processes, by as yet unknown processes, and
again with only the extremely subtle and special effects
which quantum mechanics seems to predict. Alice can-
not communicate with Bob through this phenomenon.
There is no observable action-at-a-distance. The sur-
face predictions of quantum mechanics are perfectly
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compatible with relativistic causality. It is only when
we hypothesise a hidden layer that we run into difficul-
ties.
It seems to me that we are pretty much forced into re-
jecting realism, which, please remember, is actually an
idealistic concept: outcomes “exist” of measurements
which were not performed. However, I admit it goes
against all instinct. In the case of equal settings, how
can it be that the outcomes are equal and opposite, if
they were not predetermined at the source?
Though it is perhaps only a comfort blanket, I would
like here to appeal to the limitations of our own brains,
the limitations we experience in our “understanding”
of physics due to our own rather special position in the
universe. In philosophy, this notion is called embod-
ied cognition. There is also hard empirical evidence for
this idea.
According to cognitive scientists (see, for instance,
Spelke and Kinzler, 2007), our brains are at birth hard-
wired with various basic conceptions about the world.
These “modules” are called systems of core knowl-
edge. The idea is that we cannot acquire new knowl-
edge from our sensory experiences (including learning
from experiments: we cry, and food and/or comfort is
provided) without having a prior framework in which
to interpret the data of experience and experiment. It
seems that we have modules for algebra and modules
for geometry: basic notions of number and of space.
Most interestingly in the present context, we also have
modules for causality. We distinguish between objects
and agents (we learn that we ourselves are agents).
Objects are acted on by agents. Objects have contin-
uous existence in space–time, they are local. Agents
can act on objects, also at a distance. Together this
seems to me to be a built-in assumption of determin-
ism: we have been created (by evolution) to operate in
an Aristotelian world, a world in which every effect has
a cause.
The argument (from physics, and by Occam’s ra-
zor, not from neuroscience) for abandoning realism is
made eloquently by Boris Tsirelson in an internet en-
cyclopaedia article on entanglement (Citizendium: en-
tanglement). It was Tsirelson from whom I borrowed
the terms counterfactual definiteness, relativistic local
causality, and no-conspiracy. He points out that it is
a mathematical fact that quantum physics is consistent
with relativistic local causality and with no-conspiracy.
In all of physics, there is no evidence against either of
these two principles.
I would like to close this section by mentioning a
beautiful paper by Masanes, Acin and Gisin (2006)
who argue in a very general setting (i.e., not assum-
ing quantum theory, or local realism, or anything) that
quantum nonlocality, by which they mean the violation
of Bell inequalities, together with nonsignalling, which
is the property that the marginal probability distribu-
tion seen by Alice of A does not depend on whether
Bob measures B of B ′, together imply indeterminism:
that is to say: that the world is stochastic, not determin-
istic.
5. RESOLUTION OF THE MEASUREMENT
PROBLEM
The measurement problem, also known as Schrödin-
ger’s cat problem, is the problem of how to reconcile
two apparently mutually contradictory parts of quan-
tum mechanics. When a quantum system is isolated
from the rest of the world, its quantum state (a vec-
tor, normalised to have unit length, in Hilbert space)
evolves unitarily, deterministically. When we look at a
quantum system from outside, by making a measure-
ment on it in a laboratory, the state collapses to one
of the eigenvectors of an operator corresponding to the
particular measurement, and it does so with probabil-
ities equal to the squared lengths of the projections of
the original state vector into the eigenspaces. Yet the
system being measured together with the measurement
apparatus used to probe it form together a much larger
quantum system, supposedly evolving unitarily and de-
terministically in time.
Accepting that quantum theory is intrinsically sto-
chastic, and accepting the reality of measurement out-
comes, led Belavkin (2000) to a mathematical frame-
work which he called eventum mechanics which (in
my opinion) indeed reconciles the two faces of quan-
tum physics (Schrödinger evolution, von Neumann col-
lapse) by a most simple device. Moreover, it is based on
ideas of causality with respect to time. I have attempted
to explain this model in as simple terms as possible in
Gill (2009). The following words will only make sense
to those with some familiarity with quantum mechan-
ics.
The idea is to model the world in the conventional
way with a Hilbert space, a quantum state on that
space, and a unitary evolution. Inside this framework,
we look for a collection of bounded operators on the
Hilbert space which all commute with one another, and
which are causally compatible with the unitary evo-
lution of the space, in the sense that they all com-
mute with past copies of themselves (in the Heisen-
berg picture, one thinks of the quantum observables
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as changing, the state as fixed; each observable corre-
sponds to a time indexed family of bounded operators).
We call this special family of operators the beables:
they correspond to physical properties in a classical-
like world which can co-exist, all having definite val-
ues at the same time, and definite values in the past
too. The state and the unitary evolution together de-
termine a joint probability distribution of these time-
indexed variables, that is, a stochastic process. At any
fixed time, we can condition the state of the system
on the past trajectories of the beables. This leads to a
quantum state over all bounded operators which com-
mute with all the beables.
The result is a theory in which the deterministic and
stochastic parts of traditional quantum theory are com-
bined into one harmonious whole. In fact, the notion
of restricting attention to a sub-class of all observables
goes back a long way in quantum theory under the
name super-selection rule; and abstract quantum the-
ory (and quantum field theory) has long worked with
arbitrary algebras of observables, not necessarily the
full algebra of a specific Hilbert space. With respect to
those traditional approaches the only novelty is to sup-
pose that the unitary evolution when restricted to the
sub-algebra is not invertible. It is an endomorphism,
not an isomorphism. There is an arrow of time.
It turns out that the theory is mathematically equiv-
alent to important versions of the continuous sponta-
neous localisation (CSL) model, a way to solve the
measurement problem by adding an explicit stochas-
tic collapse term to the Schrödinger equation (Initially,
the two theories seem quite different in nature). The
problem of crafting a relativistically invariant version
of CSL remained open for many years (and was a ma-
jor obstruction to its acceptance) yet just recently this
problem has been solved by Bedingham (2011). See
Pearle (1997, 2012) for further details.
CSL has been eloquently championed over the years
by Philip Pearle and I refer the reader to his many
works, in particular the two just cited, both explaining
CSL and explaining why it does solve the measurement
problem, while MWI does not.
6. LOOPHOLES
In real world experiments, the ideal experimental
protocol of particles leaving a source at definite times,
and being measured at distant locations according to
locally randomly chosen settings cannot be imple-
mented.
Experiments have been done with pairs of entangled
ions, separated only by a short distance. The measure-
ment of each ion takes a relatively long time, but at
least it is almost always successful. Such experiments
are obviously blemished by the so-called communica-
tion or locality loophole. Each particle can know very
well how the other one is being measured.
Many very impressive experiments have been per-
formed with pairs of entangled photons. Here, the mea-
surement of each photon can be performed very rapidly
and at huge distance from one another. However, many
photons fail to be detected at all. For many events in
one wing of the experiment, there is often no event
at all in the other wing, even though the physicists
are pretty sure that almost all detection events do cor-
respond to (members of) entangled pairs of photons.
This is called the detection loophole. Popularly it is
thought to be merely connected to the efficiency of
photo-detectors and that it will be easily overcome by
the development of better and better photo-detectors.
Certainly that is necessary, but not sufficient, as I will
explain.
In Weihs’ experiment mentioned earlier, only 1 in
20 of the events in each wing of the experiment is
paired with an event in the other wing. Thus, of every
400 pairs of photons—if we assume that detection and
nondetection occur independently of one another in the
two wings of the experiment—only 1 pair results in a
successful measurement of both the photons; there are
19 further unpaired events in each wing of the experi-
ment; and there were 361 pairs of photons not observed
at all.
Imagine (anthropocentrically) classical particles
about to leave the source and aiming to fake the singlet
correlations. If they are allowed to go undetected often
enough, they can engineer any correlations they like,
as follows. Consider two new photons about to leave
the source. They agree between one another with what
pair of settings they would like to be measured. Having
decided on the desired setting pair, they next generate
outcomes ±1 by drawing them from the joint probabil-
ity distribution of outcomes given settings, which they
want the experimenter to see. Only then do they each
travel to their corresponding detector. There, each par-
ticle compares the setting it had chosen in advance with
the setting chosen by Alice or Bob. If they are not the
same, it decides to go undetected. With probability 1/4
we will have successful detections in both wings of the
experiment. For those detections, the pair of settings
according to which the particles are being measured is
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identical to the pair of settings they had aimed at in
advance.
This example illustrates that if one wants to exper-
imentally prove a violation of local realism without
making the untestable statistical assumption of “miss-
ing at random”, known as the fair-sampling assump-
tion in this context, one has to put limits on the amount
of “nondetection”. There is a long history and big lit-
erature on this topic. I will just mention one of such
results.
Larsson (1998, 1999) has proved variants of the
CHSH inequality which take account of the possibil-
ity of nondetections. The idea is that under local real-
ism, as the proportion of “missing” measurements in-
creases from zero, the upper bound “2” in the CHSH
inequality (4) increases, too. We introduce a quantity
γ called the efficiency of the experiment: this is the
minimum over all setting pairs of the probability that
Alice sees an outcome given Bob sees an outcome
(and vice versa). It is not to be confused with “detec-
tor efficiency”. It turns out that the (sharp) bound on
〈AB〉lim + 〈AB ′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B ′〉lim set by lo-
cal realism is no longer 2 as in (4), but 2 + δ, where
δ = δ(γ ) = 4(γ−1 − 1).
As long as γ ≥ 1/√2 ≈ 0.7071, the bound 2 + δ is
smaller than 2
√
2. Weihs’ experiment has an efficiency
of 5%. If only we could increase it to above 71% and
simultaneously keep the state and measurements close
to perfection, we could have definitive experimental
proof of Bell’s theorem.
This would be correct for a “clocked” experiment.
Suppose now particles determine themselves the times
that they are measured. Thus, a local realist pair of
particles trying to fake the singlet correlations could
arrange between themselves that their measurement
times are delayed by smaller or greater amounts de-
pending on whether the setting they see at the detec-
tor is the setting they want to see, or not. It turns out
that this gives our devious particles even more scope
for faking correlations. Larsson and Gill (2004) called
this the coincidence loophole, and derived the sharp
bound on 〈AB〉lim + 〈AB ′〉lim + 〈A′B〉lim − 〈A′B ′〉lim
set by local realism is 2 + δ, where now δ = δ(γ ) =
6(γ−1 −1). As long as γ ≥ 3(1−1/√2) ≈ 0.8787, the
bound 2 + δ is smaller than 2√2. We need to get ex-
perimental efficiency above 88%, and keep everything
else close to perfect at the very limits allowed by quan-
tum physics.
How far is there still to go? In 2013, the Vienna
group published a paper in the journal Nature enti-
tled “Bell violation using entangled photons without
the fair-sampling assumption” (Giustina et al., 2013).
The authors write “this is the very first time that an ex-
periment has been done using photons which does not
suffer from the detection loophole”, and moreover, the
experiment “makes the photon the first physical system
for which each of the main loopholes has been closed,
albeit in different experiments”.
It was however rapidly pointed out that the experi-
ment was actually vulnerable to the coincidence loop-
hole, not “just” to the detection loophole. Now, it ac-
tually should be possible to simply re-analyse the data
from that experiment, defining coincidences with re-
spect to an externally defined lattice of time intervals
instead of relative to observed detection times only.
Ideally, this will only slightly increase the “singles
rate” and slightly decrease the number of coincidences,
thereby slightly decreasing both size and statistical sig-
nificance of the Bell violation, but hopefully without
altering the substantive conclusion. A more stringent
re-analysis of the data (Larsson et al., 2013) has con-
firmed that the initial claims were justified.
In the meantime, exploiting this gap between results
and claims, a consortium led by researchers from Illi-
nois have published their own experimental results,
also reporting that theirs is “the first experiment that
fully closes the detection loophole with photons, which
are then the only system in which both loopholes have
been closed, albeit not simultaneously” (Christensen
et al., 2013). They used the Larsson and Gill (2004)
inequality.
Is this just a question of prestige? No: various new
quantum technologies depend on quantum entangle-
ment, and in particular, various cryptographic commu-
nication protocols are not secure as long as it is possi-
ble to “fake” violation of Bell inequalities with classi-
cal systems.
It is logically possible that quantum mechanics itself
could prevent one ever from performing a both suc-
cessful and loophole-free experiment. Quantum uncer-
tainty relations could in principle prevent the creation
of a multipartite quantum system, whose components
can be measured in well-separated space–time regions,
while simultaneously those components are in the re-
quired joint entangled state. I christened this possibility
“Bell’s fifth position” in Gill (2003). Here, I just men-
tion that the possibility had already been championed
for many years by Emilios Santos, whose paper Santos
(2005) is well worth reading.
On the other hand, continuous improvement of ex-
perimental techniques over more than fifty years has
seen continuous pushing of detection efficiency toward
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the critical boundaries, without any attenuation of the
quantum correlations of the singlet state. Now that we
are getting very close indeed to the boundary, it would
seem very unlikely that we won’t be able to go past it.
I conclude this section with mention of some recent
work on the conspiracy loophole. Recently, Gallicchio,
Friedman and Kaiser (2014) have made the novel sug-
gestion to rule out conspiracy by the experimental de-
vice of choosing settings with the help of detection
times of photons arriving from widely separated, and
very distant galaxies from the dawn of time. This idea
will probably be implemented soon in an experiment
by Zeilinger. I am not however convinced by this idea:
though Alice’s setting choice is triggered by a pho-
ton which cannot yet have interacted with Bob’s mea-
surement device or the source, still the setting itself is
also partially determined by Alice’s detection appara-
tus, and it certainly has. And if there is dependence
between subsequent settings on Alice’s side, then on
Bob’s side it soon becomes possible to predict future
settings (this is known as the memory loophole).
In my opinion, we have to rule out conspiracy (en-
sure freedom) by choosing settings by a cascade of
classical randomness (coins, pseudo RNGs, etc.). We
can never logically rule out conspiratorial super deter-
minism, but we can make appeal to this escape clause
ludicrous.
7. BELL’S THEOREM WITHOUT INEQUALITIES
In recent years new proofs of Bell’s theorem have
been invented which appear to avoid probability or
statistics altogether, such as the famous GHZ (Green-
berger, Horne, Zeilinger) proof. Experiments have al-
ready been done implementing the set-up of these
proofs, and physicists have claimed that these exper-
iments prove quantum—nonlocality by the outcomes
of a finite number of runs: no statistics, no inequalities
(yet their papers do exhibit error bars).
Such a proof runs along the following lines. Suppose
local realism is true. Suppose also that some event A
is certain. Suppose that it then follows from local re-
alism that another event B has probability zero, while
under quantum mechanics it can be arranged that the
same event B has probability one. Paradoxical, but not
a contradiction in terms: the catch is that events A and
B are events under different experimental conditions: it
is only under local realism and freedom that the events
A and B can be situated in the same sample space.
Freedom is needed here to equate the probabilities of
observable events with those of unobservable events,
just as in our own proof of Bell’s theorem. We need to
be able to assume that the subset of runs of the experi-
ment in which the events were observable are a random
sample of the set of all repetitions.
When we use randomisation in experimental design,
we are assuming that randomisation is independent of
pre-existing unobserved characteristics of the experi-
mental units. Is it plausible that the outcomes of coin
tosses used to create a randomised experimental design
were predetermined together with properties of the ex-
perimental units under study, so that our random sub-
samples of units being given a particular treatment, are
actually heavily biased with regard to the properties
we measure on them? Of course, under a purely de-
terministic world view (super-determinism) everything
that was ever going to happen was determined in ad-
vance, at the dawn of creation. But even in a deter-
ministic world, pseudo-randomness exists and is well
understood.
As an example, consider the following scenario,
generalizing the Bell-CHSH scenario to the situation
where the outcome of the measurements on the two
particles is not binary, but an arbitrary real number.
This situation has been studied by Zohren and Gill
(2008), Zohren et al. (2010).
Just as before, settings are chosen at random in the
two wings of the experiment. Under local realism we
can introduce variables A, A′, B and B ′ representing
the outcomes (real numbers) in one run of the exper-
iment, both of the actually observed variables, and of
those not observed.
It turns out that it is possible under quantum mechan-
ics to arrange that Pr{B ′ ≤ A} = Pr{A ≤ B} = Pr{B ≤
A′} = 1 while Pr{B ′ ≤ A′} = 0. On the other hand, un-
der local realism, Pr{B ′ ≤ A} = Pr{A ≤ B} = Pr{B ≤
A′} = 1 implies Pr{B ′ ≤ A′} = 1.
Note that the four probability measures under which,
under quantum mechanics, Pr{A ≤ B}, Pr{A ≥ B ′},
Pr{A′ ≥ B}, Pr{A′ ≥ B ′} are defined, refer to four dif-
ferent experimental set-ups, according to which of the
four pairs (A,B), etc. we are measuring.
The experiment to verify these quantum mechanical
predictions has not yet been performed though some
colleagues are interested. Interestingly, though it re-
quires a quantum entangled state, that state should not
be the maximally entangled state (the amount of en-
tanglement of a state can be quantified in many ways,
for instance through entropy notions, but it would take
us too far into the quantum formalism to explain that
here). Maximal “quantum nonlocality” is quite differ-
ent from maximal entanglement. And this is not an iso-
lated example of the phenomenon.
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Note that even if the experiment is repeated a large
number of times, it can never prove that probabilities
like Pr{A ≤ B} are exactly equal to 1. It can only give
strong statistical evidence, at best, that the probability
in question is very close to 1 indeed. But actually ex-
periments are never perfect and more likely is that af-
ter a number of repetitions, one discovers that {A > B}
actually has positive probability—that event will hap-
pen a few times. The experimenter cannot create the
required quantum state exactly, measurements are not
perfect. Thus, the logical conclusion from the experi-
ment is that nothing has been proved.
To be sure, one can give a proof of Bell’s theorem
that the theory of quantum mechanics is in conflict with
local realism, which relies only on logic, not on proba-
bility. But if we want to use the set-up of the proof as a
set-up for an experiment, we move to a different ball-
park. We want to perform an experiment which gives
strong evidence that nature is incompatible with local
realism. It turns out that whatever experimental set-up
we take, we will necessarily find ourselves explicitly or
implicitly in the business of statistically proving viola-
tion of inequalities, as the next section will make clear.
8. BETTER BELL INEQUALITIES
Why all the attention to the CHSH inequality? There
are others around, aren’t there? And are there alterna-
tives to “inequalities” altogether? I will argue here that
the whole story is “just” a collection of inequalities,
and the reason behind this can be expressed in a simple
geometric picture.
In a precise sense, the CHSH inequality is the only
Bell inequality worth mentioning in the scenario of two
parties, two measurements per party, two outcomes per
measurement. Let us generalise this scenario and con-
sider p parties, each choosing between one of q mea-
surements, where each measurement has r possible
outcomes (further generalisations are possible to un-
balanced experiments, multi-stage experiments, and so
on). I want to explain why CHSH plays a very central
role in the 2 × 2 × 2 case, and why in general, gener-
alised Bell inequalities are all there is when studying
the p× q × r case. The short answer is: these inequali-
ties are the bounding hyperplanes of a convex polytope
of “everything allowed by local realism”. The vertices
of the polytope are deterministic local realistic mod-
els. An arbitrary local realist model is a mixture of the
models corresponding to the vertices. Such a mixture
is a hidden variables model, the hidden variable being
the particular random vertex chosen by the mixing dis-
tribution in a specific instance.
From quantum mechanics, after we have fixed a joint
p-partite quantum state, and sets of q r-valued mea-
surements per party, we will be able to write down
probability tables p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) where the vari-
ables x, y, etc. take values in 1, . . . , q , and label the
measurement used by the first, second, . . . party. The
variables a, b, etc., take values in 1, . . . , r and label the
possible outcomes of the measurements. Altogether,
there are qprp “elementary probabilities” in this list
of tables. More generally, any specific instance of a
theory, whether local-realist, quantum mechanical, or
beyond, generates such a list of probability tables, and
defines thereby a point in qprp-dimensional Euclidean
space.
We can therefore envisage the sets of all local-realist
models, all quantum models, and so on, as subsets of
qprp-dimensional Euclidean space. Now, whatever the
theory, for any values of x, y, etc., the sum of the prob-
abilities p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) must equal 1. These are
called normalisation constraints. Moreover, whatever
the theory, all probabilities must be nonnegative: pos-
itivity constraints. Quantum mechanics is certainly lo-
cal in the sense that the marginal distribution of the
outcome of any one of the measurements of any one
of the parties does not depend on which measurements
are performed by the other parties. Since marginaliza-
tion corresponds again to summation of probabilities,
these so-called no-signalling constraints are expressed
by linear equalities in the elements in the probability
tables corresponding to a specific model. Not surpris-
ingly, local-realist models also satisfy the no-signalling
constraints.
We will call a list of probability tables restricted
only by positivity, normalisation and no-signalling,
but otherwise completely arbitrary, a no-signalling
model. The positivity constraints are linear inequal-
ities which place us in the positive orthant of Eu-
clidean space. Normalisation and no-signalling are lin-
ear equalities which place us in a certain affine sub-
space of Euclidean space. Intersection of orthant and
affine sub-space creates a convex polytope: the set of
all no-signalling models. We want to study the sets of
local-realist models, of quantum models, and of no-
signalling models. We already know that local-realist
and quantum are contained in no-signalling. It turns
out that these sets are successively larger, and strictly
so: quantum includes all local-realist and more (that’s
Bell’s theorem); no-signalling includes all quantum
and more (that is Tsirelson’s inequality combined with
an example of a no-signalling model which violates
Tsirelson’s inequality).
524 R. D. GILL
FIG. 3. Left: a caricature of the 2 × 2 × 2 case. It actually lives in 8, not 2 dimensions. Right: caricature of the general case in which
(bottom left) a further possibility is allowed: no purple between the green and grey. Artwork: Daniel Cavalcanti.
Let us investigate the local-realist models in more
detail. A special class of local-realist models are
the local-deterministic models. A local-deterministic
model is a model in which all of the probabilities
p(a, b, . . . |x, y, . . .) equal 0 or 1 and the no-signalling
constraints are all satisfied. This implies that for each
possible measurement by each party, the outcome is
prescribed, independently of what measurements are
made by the other parties. Now, it is easy to see that any
local-realist model corresponds to a probability mix-
ture of local-deterministic models. After all, it “is” a
joint probability distribution of simultaneous outcomes
of each possible measurement on each system, and thus
it “is” a probability mixture of degenerate distributions:
fix the random element ω, and each outcome of each
possible measurement of each party is fixed; we re-
cover their joint distribution by picking ω at random.
This makes the set of local-realist models a convex
polytope: all mixtures of a finite set of extreme points.
Therefore, it can also be described as the intersection of
a finite collection of half-spaces, each half-space cor-
responding to a boundary hyperplane.
It can also be shown that the set of quantum models
is closed and convex, but its boundary is very difficult
to describe.
Let us think of these three models from “within”
the affine sub-space of no-signalling and normalisa-
tion. Relative to this sub-space, the no-signalling mod-
els form a full (nonempty interior) closed convex poly-
tope. The quantum models form a strictly smaller
closed, convex, full set. The local-realist models form
a strictly smaller still, closed, convex, full polytope.
Slowly, we have arrived at a rather simple picture,
Figure 3. Imagine a square, with a circle inscribed in
it, and with another smaller square inscribed within the
circle. The outer square represents the boundary of the
set of all no-signalling models. The circle is the bound-
ary of the convex set of all quantum models. The square
inscribed within the circle is the boundary of the set of
all local-realist models. The picture is oversimplified.
For instance, the vertices of the local-realist polytope
are also extreme points of the quantum body and ver-
tices of the no-signalling polytope.
A generalised Bell inequality is simply a bound-
ary hyperplane, or face, of the local-realist polytope,
relative to the normalisation and no-signalling affine
sub-space, and excluding boundaries corresponding to
the positivity constraints. I will call these interesting
boundary hyperplanes “nontrivial”. In the 2 × 2 × 2
case, for which the affine sub-space where all the ac-
tion lies is 8-dimensional, the local-realist polytope has
exactly 8 nontrivial boundary hyperplanes. They cor-
respond exactly to all possible CHSH inequalities (ob-
tained by permuting outcomes, measurements and par-
ties). Thus, in the 2 × 2 × 2 case, the Bell-CHSH in-
equality is indeed “all there is”.
When we increase p, q or r , new Bell inequalities
turn up, and moreover, keep turning up (“new” means
not obtainable from “old” by omitting parties or mea-
surements or grouping outcomes). It seems a hope-
less (and probably pointless) exercise to try to classify
them.
A natural question is whether every nontrivial gener-
alised Bell inequality can actually be violated by quan-
tum mechanics. I posed this as an open question a long
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time ago, and for a long time the answer seemed prob-
ably be “yes”. However, a nice counter-example has
recently been discovered; see Almeida et al. (2010).
Quite a few generalised Bell inequalities have turned
out to be of particular interest, for instance, the work of
Zohren and Gill concerned the 2 × 2 × r case and dis-
cussed a class of inequalities, one for each r , whose
asymptotic properties could be studied as r increased
to infinity. Further statistical connections to missing
data problems and optimal experimental design, have
been exploited by van Dam, Gill and Grünwald (2005)
and Gill (2007).
Much of the material of this section is covered in an
excellent survey paper by Brunner et al. (2014), from
which I took, with the permission both of the authors
and of the artist Daniel Cavalcanti, the two illustrations
in Figure 3: the first is a cartoon of the 2 × 2 × 2 case,
the second of the general case.
9. QUANTUM RANDI CHALLENGES
A second reason for the specific form of the proof
of Bell’s theorem which started this paper is that it
lends itself well to design of computer challenges. Ev-
ery year, new researchers publish, or try to publish,
papers in which they claim that Bell made some fun-
damental errors, and in which they put forward a spe-
cific local realist model which allegedly reproduces the
quantum correlations. The papers are long and compli-
cated; the author finds it hard to get the work published,
and suspects a conspiracy by “The Establishment”. The
claims regularly succeed in attracting media attention,
occasionally becoming head-line news in serious sci-
ence journalism; some papers are published, too, and
not only in obscure journals.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
I used to find it useful in debates with “Bell-deniers” to
challenge them to implement their local realist model
as computer programs for a network of classical com-
puters, connected so as to mimic the time and space
separations of the Bell-CHSH experiments.
The protocol of the challenge I issued in the past
is the following. Bell-denier is to write computer pro-
grams for three personal computers, which are to play
the roles of source S , measurement station A, and mea-
surement station B. The following is to be repeated
say 15,000 times. First, S sends messages to A and
B. Next, connections between A, B and S are sev-
ered. Next, from the outside world so to speak, I de-
liver the results of two coin tosses (performed by my-
self), separately of course, as input setting to A and
to B. Heads or tails correspond to a request for A or
A′ at A, and for B or B ′ at B. The two measurement
stations A and B now each output an outcome ±1. Set-
tings and outcomes are collected for later data analysis,
Bell-denier’s computers are re-connected; next run.
Bell-denier’s computers can contain huge tables of
random numbers, shared between the three, and of
course they can use pseudo-random number genera-
tors of any kind. By sharing the pseudo-random keys in
advance, they have resources to any amount of shared
randomness they like.
In Gill (2003), I showed how a martingale Hoeffd-
ing inequality gives an exponential bound like (3) in
the situation just described. This enabled me to choose
N , and a criterion for win/lose (say, halfway between
2 and 2
√
2), and a guarantee to Bell-denier (at least
so many runs with each combination of settings), such
that I would happily bet 3000 Euros any day that Bell-
denier’s computers will fail the challenge.
The point (for me) was not to win money for my-
self, but to enable the Bell-denier who considers ac-
cepting the challenge (a personal challenge between
the two of us, with adjudicators to enforce the proto-
col) to discover for him or herself that “it cannot be
done”. It is important that the adjudicators do not need
to look inside the programs written by the Bell-denier,
and preferably do not even need to look inside his com-
puters. They are black boxes. The only thing that has
to be enforced are the communication rules. However,
there are difficulties here. What if Bell-denier’s com-
puters are using a wireless network which the adjudi-
cators cannot detect?
A new kind of computer challenge, called the “quan-
tum Randi challenge”, was proposed in 2011 by
Sascha Vongehr (Science2.0: QRC). It is inspired by
the well known challenge to “paranormal phenom-
ena” by James Randi (scientific sceptic and fighter
against pseudo-science, see Wikipedia: James Randi).
Vongehr’s challenge (see Vongehr, 2012, 2013) dif-
fers in a number of fundamental respects from mine,
which indeed was not a quantum Randi challenge in
Vongehr’s sense.
Sascha Vongehr’s QRC completely cuts out any ne-
cessity for communication, protocol verification, adju-
dication. In fact, the Bell-denier no longer has to co-
operate with myself or with any other member of the
establishment. They simply have to write a program
which should perform a certain task. They post their
program on internet. If others find that it does indeed
perform that task, the news will spread like wildfire.
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Vongehr prefers Bell’s original inequality, and I pre-
fer CHSH, so I will here present an (unauthorised)
“CHSH style” modification of his QRC.
Suppose someone has invented a local hidden vari-
ables theory. He can use it to simulate N = 800 runs
of a CHSH experiment. Typically, he will simulate the
source, the photons, the detectors, all in one program.
Let us suppose that his computer code produces repro-
ducible results, which means that the code or the ap-
plication is reasonably portable, and will give identical
output when run on another computer with the same in-
puts. In particular, if it makes use of a pseudo random
number generator (RNG), it must have the usual “save”
and “restore” facilities for the seed of the RNG. Let us
suppose that the program calls the RNG the same num-
ber of times for each run, and that the program does not
make use in any way of memory of past measurement
settings. The program must accept any legal stream of
pairs of binary measurement settings of any length N .
In particular then, the program can be run with
N = 1 and all four possible pairs of measurement
settings, and the same initial random seed, and it
will thereby generate successively four pairs (A,B),
(A′,B), (A,B ′), (A′,B ′). If the programmer neither
cheated nor made any errors, in other words, if the pro-
gram is a correct implementation of a genuine LHV
model, then both values of A are the same, and so are
both values of A′, both values of B , and both values of
B ′. We now have the first row of the N ×4 spreadsheet
of Section 2 of this paper.
The random seed at the end of the previous phase
is now used as the initial seed for another phase, the
second run, generating a second row of the spread-
sheet. This is where the prohibition of exploiting mem-
ory comes into force. The second row of counterfactual
outcomes has to be completed without knowing which
particular setting pair Alice and Bob will actually pick
for the first row.
Notice that the LHV model is allowed to use time,
since the saved random seeds could also include the
current run number and the initial random seed value,
too: in other words, when doing the calculations for the
nth run, the LHV model has access to everything it did
in the previous n − 1 runs.
My claim is that a correct implementation of a bona-
fide LHV model which does not exploit the memory
loophole can be used to fill in the N × 4 spreadsheet of
Section 2. When we now generate random settings and
calculate the correlations, we get the same results as if
they had been submitted in a single stream to the same
program, run once with the same initial seed.
My new CHSH-style QRC to any local realist out
there who is interested, is that they program their LHV
model, modified so that it simply accepts a random
seed and value of N , and outputs an N ×4 spreadsheet.
They should post it on internet and draw attention to
it on any of the many internet fora devoted to discus-
sions of quantum foundations. Anyone interested runs
the program, generates N × 2 settings, and calculates
CHSH. If the program reproducibly, repeatedly (signif-
icantly more than half the time, cf. Conjecture 1 of Sec-
tion 2), violates CHSH, then the creator has created a
classical physical system which systematically violates
the CHSH inequalities, thereby disproving Bell’s the-
orem. No establishment conspiracy can stop this news
from spreading round the world, everyone can replicate
the experiment. The creator will get the Nobel prize
and there will be incredible repercussions throughout
physics.
Some local realists will however insist on using
memory. They cannot rewrite their programs to cre-
ate one N × 4 spreadsheet. Instead, N rounds of com-
munication are needed between themselves and some
trusted neutral vetting agency. To borrow an idea I
learnt from Han Geurdes, we should think of some
kind of rating agency such as those for banks, an in-
dependent agency which carries out “stress tests”, on
demand, but at a reasonable price, to anyone who is
interested and will pay. The procedure is almost as be-
fore: it ensures yet again that the LHV model is le-
gitimate, or more precisely, is legitimate in its imple-
mented form. The agency generates a first run of set-
tings (i.e., one setting pair), but keeps it secret for the
moment. The LHV theorist supplies a first run-set of
values of (A,A′,B,B ′). The agency reveals the first
setting pair, the LHV theorist generates a second run
set (A,A′,B,B ′). This is repeated N = 800 times.
The whole procedure can be repeated any number of
times, the results are published on internet, everyone
can judge for themselves.
APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof of (3) will use the following two Hoeffd-
ing inequalities:
FACT 3 (Binomial). Suppose X ∼ Bin(n,p) and
t > 0. Then
Pr(X/n ≥ p + t) ≤ exp(−2nt2).
FACT 4 (Hypergeometric). Suppose X is the num-
ber of red balls found in a sample without replacement
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of size n from a vase containing pM red balls and
(1 − p)M blue balls and t > 0. Then
Pr(X/n ≥ p + t) ≤ exp(−2nt2).
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. In each row of our N × 4
table of numbers ±1, the product AB equals ±1. For
each row, with probability 1/4, the product is either
observed or not observed. Let NobsAB denote the num-
ber of rows in which both A and B are observed.
Then NobsAB ∼ Bin(N,1/4), and hence by Fact 3, for any
δ > 0,
Pr
(
NobsAB
N
≤ 1
4
− δ
)
≤ exp(−2Nδ2).
Let N+AB denote the total number of rows (i.e., out
of N ) for which AB = +1, define N−AB similarly. Let
N
obs,+
AB denote the number of rows such that AB = +1
among those selected for observation of A and B . Con-
ditional on NobsAB = n, Nobs,+AB is distributed as the num-
ber of red balls in a sample without replacement of size
n from a vase containing N balls of which N+AB are red
and N−AB are blue. Therefore by Fact 4, conditional on
NobsAB = n, for any ε > 0,
Pr
(
N
obs,+
AB
NobsAB
≥ N
+
AB
N
+ ε
)
≤ exp(−2nε2).
Recall that 〈AB〉 stands for the average of the prod-
uct AB over the whole table; this can be rewritten as
〈AB〉 = N
+
AB − N−AB
N
= 2N
+
AB
N
− 1.
Similarly, 〈AB〉obs denotes the average of the product
AB just over the rows of the table for which both A
and B are observed; this can be rewritten as
〈AB〉obs = N
obs,+
AB − Nobs,−AB
NobsAB
= 2N
obs,+
AB
NobsAB
− 1.
For given δ > 0 and ε > 0, all of NobsAB , NobsAB ′ , N
obs
A′B and
NobsA′B ′ are at least (
1
4 −δ)N with probability at least 1−
4 exp(−2Nδ2). On the event where this happens, the
conditional probability that 〈AB〉obs exceeds 〈AB〉 +
2ε is bounded by
exp
(−2NobsABε2)≤ exp(−2(14 − δ
)
Nε2
)
.
The same is true for the other three averages (for the
last one we first exchange the roles of + and − to get a
bound on 〈−A′B ′〉obs). Combining everything, we get
that
〈AB〉obs + 〈AB ′〉obs + 〈A′B〉obs − 〈A′B ′〉obs ≤ 2 + 8ε,
except possibly on an event of probability at most
p = 4 exp(−2Nδ2)+ 4 exp(−2(14 − δ
)
Nε2
)
.
We want to bound p by 8 exp(−N(η/16)2) where η =
8ε, making (η/16)2 = (ε/2)2. Choosing 8δ2 = ε2, we
find 2δ2 = (ε/2)2 = (η/16)2. If 8(14 − δ) ≥ 1, then p ≤
8 exp(−2Nδ2) and we are home. The restriction on δ
translates to δ ≤ 18 and thence to η ≤ 2
√
2. But for η >
2, (3) is trivially true anyway, so the restriction on η
can be forgotten. 
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